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## Theory and Practice in the Mao Period

PAUL M. SWEEZY

## Chile and Latin America

JAMES F. PETRAS

*Universality and Cultural Spheres*

SAMIR AMIN

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## NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Many more manuscripts are submitted to MR and MR Press than we have any possibility of publishing. If we personally read them all, we quite literally would be doing nothing else, which we like to think would not be the best use of our time. So a number of procedures are followed which can be more or less adequately described as follows: (1) Those mss. which clearly fall outside the scope of the magazine and the press are promptly rejected for that reason, the return of the mss. in question depending on whether the senders included return postage along with their submissions (this holds for all rejected mss. whatever the reason). Only relatively few fall into this category, obviously because most authors have a pretty good idea of what would and what would not be appropriate for MR and MRP either as a book or for the magazine. (2) A considerable number of mss. deal with subjects we would like to include in our upcoming publication plans. These we usually read ourselves ("ourselves" here meaning everyone around the office with a special interest in or knowledge of the subject(s) in question). If we conclude after discussion that an ms. is clearly not for us, a rejection follows. The reason may be low quality, excessive length (generally speaking, articles for the magazine

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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# THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE MAO PERIOD

By Paul M. Sweezy

Marxism grows and develops through the historical experience of class struggles and their reflection in the thoughts of leaders and participants. The two greatest periods and sources of such advance have been the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. While it is of course much too soon to come to any final conclusions, the death of a great leader like Mao Tse-tung inevitably marks a turning point and invites consideration of what has been accomplished during his lifetime.

When the time comes to attempt an overall evaluation of the Mao period, it may well be concluded that its most important contribution to the advance of Marxism was to break what may be called the tyranny of the Soviet model. The very foundation of this model was "primitive socialist accumulation" at the expense of the peasantry, and its dominant thrust was the building up of heavy industry while concomitantly downgrading the development of light industry and the production of consumer goods.* The application of this model had (and

This article was written for, and is published here by arrangement with, a new British journal, *Problems of Communism*, the first issue of which is appearing this month. (Subscriptions: $7, surface mail; address: 138 Lordship Road, London, N.16.)

* The term "primitive socialist accumulation" was Evgeny Preobrazhensky's, but it was far more appropriate to the Stalinist practice than to the relatively mild program advocated by Preobrazhensky himself.



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has) many implications: the ending of all hope of an effective worker-peasant alliance and hence (in countries with peasant majorities) the necessity of a severely repressive state. And this in turn meant the renunciation of any possibility of transforming social relations in the direction of communism. In the Marxist orthodoxy of the Stalin period—from the 1920s to the 1950s—this problem, to the extent that it was not dealt with in a purely propagandistic way, was put off until some future time when the forces of production would presumably have developed to the point of making general abundance a reality. In this way, development of the forces of production was turned into a sort of universal panacea for all the ills and contradictions of society, and from this it followed that for a socialist society the highest and overriding objective for the foreseeable future must be the most rapid attainable development of the forces of production.*

In the first years after they came to power the Chinese Communists set out to follow the Soviet model but soon discovered that it put demands on the agricultural sector which could not be met. In a similar situation in the 1920s the Russians decided to squeeze the needed surplus out of the peasants, with the fateful consequences noted above. Quite apart from any reluctance on the part of the Chinese leadership to follow this course, the option did not exist as a realistic possibility. Unlike in the Russian case, the surplus to be squeezed out of the peasantry was simply not there.** A different course had to be

* The counterpart to this theory of the productive forces—as the Chinese have called it—is that the fatal flaw of capitalism was that it had finally become, in Marx's phrase, a fetter on the development of the forces of production, a proposition which seemed self-evident in the 1930s. Note that this theory had the effect of making analysis of other contradictions of capitalism unimportant or unnecessary. (One example which readily comes to mind in the nuclear age is that capitalism might *overdevelop* the forces of production in self-destructive ways without being able to provide any effective controls. Another is that in its unlimited urge to expand it might in effect destroy its own natural base and environment.)

** This problem and its implications are analyzed by Harry Magdoff in an important article, "China: Contrasts with the USSR," MONTHLY REVIEW (July-August 1975), especially pp. 29-32.

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adopted. And it was here that Maoist ideas, based on long years in governing the border regions and conducting the wars against the Kuomintang and the Japanese, came into their own as policy guides for the whole country. Priorities were re-ordered: industry was to be geared to the needs of agriculture and developed not only in the cities but also and especially in the countryside, employing surplus rural labor and beginning the process of introducing the peasantry to modern technology. The absolute priority accorded to heavy industry in the Soviet model was abandoned, with the development of heavy industry also being integrated into a strategy which put agriculture (and the 80 percent of the people dependent upon it) at the top of the nation's concerns. This meant that the "capital" needed to develop the Chinese economy was to come not from any pre-existing source of surplus—as both bourgeois economic theory and the Soviet orthodoxy of the period believed essential—but from a general increase in the productivity (agricultural and industrial alike) of the Chinese labor force. In this way the imposition of a special burden on any particular section of the population could be avoided and the whole issue of primitive socialist accumulation rendered irrelevant and meaningless. And politically this would permit the maintenance and even strengthening of the worker-peasant alliance, which in turn would make the build-up of a specially repressive state apparatus as unnecessary as it would be irrational.

Carrying through this new strategy of development was by no means easy. It required a vast and historically unprecedented institutional innovation in the form of the agricultural communes; it suffered severe setbacks in the hard years of 1959-1962; and it finally got on track only with the introduction in 1962 and after of a Chinese version of the Green Revolution.* After that, however, it worked remarkably well: China became essentially self-sufficient in agricultural production; and industry developed, in terms of both rapidity and geographical distribution, in quite satisfactory fashion. It was thereby shown once

* See the article by Harry Magdoff cited in the previous footnote, and Ben Stavis, "China's Green Revolution," MONTHLY REVIEW (October 1974).

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and for all that the Soviet model, far from being an embodiment of the "laws" of socialism, was merely one possible path to economic development and in all probability one which is in irreconcilable contradiction with the requirements of a socialist transition toward communism. Never again, after the Chinese experience in the period 1955-1965, will a newly liberated country feel compelled to choose between the classical capitalist and Soviet roads to economic development.

This was the first momentous achievement of the Mao period. But it was not the only one. The Cultural Revolution was yet to come, and the issues involved, while closely related to the strategy of economic development, were also of a different order.

The basic problem can perhaps best be understood if set in the perspective of orthodox Soviet political theory of the 1930s. According to this theory, the proletarian revolution overthrows capitalism and/or other forms of class society by abolishing private ownership of the means of production. The government which presides over this process and at the same time takes in hand the task of developing the forces of production is a dictatorship of the proletariat in the specific sense that it represses the old possessing classes and thwarts their inevitable counter-revolutionary efforts. Vis-à-vis the working class and its peasant allies, however, the revolutionary government is a democracy much more genuine than even the freest of bourgeois democracies. From these premises it follows that with the dying out of the old bourgeois and feudal ruling classes, the development of the forces of production, and the continuous elevation of the standard of living of the mass of the people, the class struggle will diminish in intensity and gradually disappear; and the state as a special apparatus of repression will, in the classical Marxian phrase, "wither away." To be sure, these processes will not be able to work their way through to completion as long as capitalism exists on an international scale and the world bourgeoisie continues to support the counter-revolutionary ambitions of the overthrown classes: during this period the state will continue to exist as a repressive apparatus against outside intervention. But this will not affect the basic tendencies at work as far as the internal structure and dynamics of the post-

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revolutionary society are concerned. Here democracy will flourish, and the path to a future transition to communism will be mapped out, subject only to the requirement of an adequate development of the forces of production.

The trouble with this theory of course was that it was in no way borne out by the experience of the Soviet Union. From the earliest days of the revolutionary government, repression was directed at large sections of the population, not only at the deposed exploiting classes; and this became an increasing, not a decreasing, characteristic of Soviet society with the passage of time. Responses to this situation were of several kinds: orthodox Stalinists simply denied that there was any massive internal repression, their propaganda becoming more and more strident in proportion to its obvious belying of the facts. The other main reactions were those of the various brands of Trotskyists, all of whom were agreed that what was happening in the USSR was an aberration from, rather than a refutation of, the basic theory, and all of whom stressed the backwardness of traditional Russian society as the underlying cause. According to this view, a backward society inevitably inherits and/or breeds a large bureaucracy to perform economic and political managerial functions. Either this bureaucracy will be kept under the democratic control of the workers and their allies until, with the development of the productive forces, it is no longer necessary and can be dispensed with, or it will grab the levers of power and repress the masses, which is what happened in the Soviet Union under Stalin. At this point there was a division between those who, following Trotsky himself, believed that sooner or later a second, this time purely political revolution would be necessary to restore power to the masses. Others, of whom Isaac Deutscher was perhaps the leading representative, took the position that after the death of Stalin, as the educational and cultural level of the Soviet peoples rose under the impact of the developing forces of production, a gradual process of democratization would set in which would eventually bring the Soviet Union into line with the theory sketched above.

It is important to recognize that none of what may be called these "aberration theories," no matter how scathingly critical of developments in the Soviet Union, had any place for

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the idea that the results of the October Revolution had been or were in the process of being negated. The bureaucracy was seen as an unavoidable excrescence on an otherwise healthy body politic, one which could and would be removed, either violently or peacefully, when the consequences of backwardness had been sufficiently overcome.*

However plausible this view may have seemed in the 1930s, or even two decades later, it certainly appears in a very different light today, sixty years after the October Revolution and more than a quarter of a century after the Second World War. The extreme methods of repression in use under Stalin were abandoned after his death, but Deutscher's optimistic assumption that a gradual process of democratization had been initiated proved to be without foundation. And above all the notion that the combination of state ownership of the means of production plus rapid development of the forces of production would somehow open the socialist road to communism has turned out to be the grand illusion of the Marxism of the period of the Third International. The Soviet Union is now the world's second industrial power with a high level of popular education and a vast trained intelligentsia, and yet its working class has no access to political power, is barred from any form of self-organization, and probably has less influence on its conditions and methods of work than the working classes of the advanced European capitalist countries.

Evidently there was something radically wrong with the political theories of the Stalin period, including both those of the official Stalinists and those of their main opponents. The Soviet Union was neither a developing socialist democracy, modified only to the extent necessary to defend itself against external counterrevolutionary intervention, nor was it basically a healthy workers' state temporarily deflected from its natural course of development by the rule of an overweening bureaucracy. In reality it had become a social formation which was neither foreseen nor easily accounted for by any of the existing

* A logical corollary, which however need not concern us in the present context, is that a post-revolutionary society in an already developed country would not be subject to the evils which had befallen the Soviet Union.

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versions of Marxian theory. To illuminate this situation and lay at least the foundations for a more adequate Marxian theory of post-revolutionary society was the second great accomplishment of China under Mao's leadership.

Here, as in the case of the rejection of the Soviet model of economic development, it was practice which led the way and theory which lagged behind. "Learning from the Soviet Union," which was a cardinal principle in China in the first years after the takeover of power in 1949, naturally meant copying much in addition to the central strategy of economic development. Bureaucratic and elitist practices permeated all sectors of Chinese society, including the economy, government, and education. These were very much in the tradition of age-old Confucian habits of thought and action and hence were easily assimilated by those newly in authority. On the other hand, they were in sharp contrast to many of the ways of doing things that had evolved in the years of civil strife, resistance to Japanese invaders, and governance of large border regions in the 1930s and 1940s. Chinese Communism thus developed a kind of split personality, deeply rooted in the history of China as well as in its own history as a revolutionary movement. Both tendencies were of course represented in the ruling Communist Party, with Liu Shao-chi as the most prominent figure in the conservative or right-wing camp and Mao Tse-tung holding the same position in the radical or left-wing camp. Not that this division was altogether new: in one form or another, indeed, it went back to the very beginnings of the Party, but its full and fateful significance could only come to the fore after the seizure of power and the assumption of responsibility for the future course of the country as a whole.

This is not the place for a review of the history of what later came to be known as the "two-line struggle" in the period between 1949 and the Cultural Revolution. Suffice it to say that as long as the problem was one of overthrowing the old order and securely establishing the new, the differences remained in the background. But the more attention had to be focused on what the shape of the new order was to be, the more the differences came to the fore, with the Liuist tendency embracing the Soviet model and all that went with it, and the

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Maoists struggling to deepen the revolution and carry it forward from one stage to the next, always in the direction of greater equality and fuller participation by the masses in controlling and managing their own lives. The Maoists scored an important victory with the Great Leap Forward and the immediately following fall of Peng Teh-huai; but the opposition made a strong comeback in the "hard years," and the early 1960s witnessed the proliferation of elitist tendencies in both economics and politics.

This was the setting for the Cultural Revolution. It originated in a revolt of university students—comparable to similar movements in the West—against exaggerated forms of elitism deeply rooted in Chinese tradition, and from there it spread to the schools and other sectors of the younger generation. Mao, whose dominance in the country's leadership had suffered a partial eclipse in the rightward movement of the early 1960s, saw in this uprising of the youth his opportunity to regain the initiative for the left. Using such slogans as "It is Justified to Rebel" and "Bombard the Headquarters," he embarked the country on a three-year voyage through stormy seas and rocky shoals, which came perilously close to shipwreck on more than one occasion. The schools and universities were closed while students roamed the country with the revolutionary message; many leaders were dismissed and disgraced; Party Committees were disbanded and replaced by new "Revolutionary Committees"; the People's Liberation Army had to be called upon in numerous situations to prevent factional struggles from degenerating into civil war. And all the while the post-Great Leap move to the right was being reversed, and the initiative in matters of economic and social policy was passing into the hands of those who stood for propelling the revolution forward in the direction of greater equality and greater mass participation.

It would take someone far more knowledgeable than the present writer to trace the impact of these tremendous social upheavals in the realm of theory. I shall therefore focus entirely on one aspect and one outcome which seem to me to have fundamentally and definitively transformed Marxian political theory as it had taken shape in the period of the Third International.

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Among the Chinese themselves there has never been any doubt that all the struggles which have taken place since 1949 have been in one way or another manifestations of class struggle which, since the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto*, has been seen by Marxists as the motor force of historical change since the period of primitive communism. But precisely what is meant by class struggle in a modern post-revolutionary society has never to this day been satisfactorily analyzed or explained. There are three strands of thought here which need to be clearly distinguished.

(1) The overthrow of a bourgeois and/or feudal regime does not do away with the old exploiting classes. These will of course strive by every available means to defeat their conquerors and to return to power. In the course of doing so they will wage fierce class struggles which can be expected to continue until the old exploiting classes have died out. All Marxists, whatever their differences, agree that in this sense class struggle is an inevitable feature of post-revolutionary society.

(2) The ideas, values, and habits of thought and behavior of the old ruling classes—which, Marx insisted, have always been the ruling ideas of a society—do not die out with their progenitors. They are deeply imbedded in all strata of society, and this is especially true of the educated elements which naturally play a prominent role in revolutionary leaderships. The struggle to get rid of this inherited and necessarily counter-revolutionary mental baggage is also in a very real sense a class struggle, though Marxists have not always identified it as such.

(3) The third strand is the most complicated and the least understood. Running a post-revolutionary society requires administrators, managers, technicians, experts of various kinds; and, compared to ordinary workers and peasants, the people occupying these positions have higher incomes and dispose over substantial perquisites and power. And regardless of class origin or degree of subjection to the dominance of old ideas, those who enjoy such privileged positions soon develop a vested interest in maintaining them and seek, consciously or unconsciously, to pass them along to their children. (To a considerable extent this intergenerational transmittal of privileged position happens anyway, since children of favored households have an im-

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portant headstart in school which, on the average, means that the chances of following in their parents' footsteps are better than those of their less-favored classmates.) All of this of course has long been known to sociologists, and (so far as I know) has never been denied by Marxists. But given the premises of the orthodox political theory of the Stalin period, these questions of relative power and privilege were treated as part of the problematic of bureaucracy rather than class, classes being entirely defined and circumscribed by the property system. According to this theory, in a socialist setting the very existence of a bureaucracy, whatever its undesirable qualities and tendencies, was a temporary and transitional phenomenon. With the inevitable development of the productive forces (unleashed by the abolition of private property in the means of production) the conditions necessitating a bureaucracy would gradually disappear and the stratum itself would follow in due course. In the meantime—and this is a crucially important point—the struggle against bureaucracy would take the form of measures to control excesses and inculcate in bureaucrats a greater sense of social responsibility. The argument in a nutshell is that elites are inevitable for a long time to come (until they more or less automatically disappear), but they ought to be well-behaved elites. On the other hand, if one takes the position that the managerial stratum is not a bureaucracy in this sense but rather an incipient ruling (and exploiting) class, then the struggle against it must be a class struggle in the full sense of the term with the ultimate objective not of controlling it and making it more socially responsible but of eliminating it altogether and achieving a genuinely classless society. This in turn implies the belief that workers and peasants, through prolonged struggle lasting a whole historical epoch but beginning immediately, can themselves master and assume responsibility for the functions which are carried out by the privileged managers and bureaucrats in the first post-revolutionary phase.

Against this background, the thesis which I am concerned to uphold can be briefly stated. In the Chinese political discussions, debates, and polemics of the 1950s and 1960s, the meaning of the term "class struggle" gradually shifted from almost exclusive emphasis on the first sense sketched above to a combina-

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tion of the second and third senses, with the third having acquired clear predominance by the end of the Cultural Revolution. In other words the class enemy, which the workers and their allies were being exhorted to struggle against, started out being the old ruling classes, increasingly became elites (and others as well) still dominated by the ideas, values, etc., of the old ruling classes, and ended up being a "new bourgeoisie" produced (and incessantly reproduced) by the social formation which had emerged from the revolution itself.

That this last conception of classes and class struggle in post-revolutionary society is as applicable to the Soviet Union as to China is obvious: indeed the evidence and reasoning to support it came at least as much from Soviet as from Chinese experience. It is also obvious that its implications for the political theory inherited by China from the Soviet Union are devastating. The notion that abolition of private property in the means of production ushers in an essentially classless society which, given a sufficient development of the forces of production, will evolve in a harmonious way toward communism—this notion is exploded once and for all. In its place we have a conception of socialism as a class-divided society like all that have preceded it, and one which has the potential to move forward or backward depending on the fortunes of a class struggle through which alone the human race can aspire to leave behind the horrors and miseries of the past and lay the foundations for a future worthy of its capabilities.

Many will find this a discouraging conclusion. Revolution, they firmly believed, would mark a decisive turning point, after which progress, however slow and painful, could only be in the direction of the higher stage of communism of which Marx wrote in *The Critique of the Gotha Program*. What had to be overcome was the terrible heritage of the past, not the inherent contradictions of the new society. The experience of the Mao period shattered this optimistic illusion. Post-revolutionary society contains not only contradictions inherited from millennia of class-riven society, it produces and reproduces its own contradictions. The revolution provides no final solutions. It only opens the possibility of moving forward *in the direction*

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of eliminating classes. But the existence of this as a possibility implies its opposite, the possibility of moving backward toward the re-entrenchment of an exploiting class based not on private property in the means of production but on control of an all-encompassing repressive state apparatus.

According to the theory developed in the Mao period this is precisely what actually happened in the Soviet Union. Would it also happen in China after Mao? That it might is inherent in the theory itself. Whether it will, can only depend on the still unknown future course of a class struggle the meaning and importance of which must now be recognized and pondered by all who seek to understand the historical period in which we live.

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You are making the socialist revolution, and yet don't know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—those in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist-roaders are still on the capitalist road.

—Mao Tse-tung, quoted in *Peking Review* (June 25, 1976)

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# CHILE AND LATIN AMERICA

BY JAMES F. PETRAS

The topic we are discussing is Chile, the consolidation of the dictatorship, and social conditions as they exist today in Chile. First, we will outline what the Chilean military rulers claimed they were going to do: the so-called models set up with the advice and consent of Secretary of the Treasury Simon and the CIA, which openly boasted of its participation in designing this plan; the international financiers who are bankrolling this economic plan; and, of course, University of Chicago economists Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger who are, so to speak, the Godfathers of this Mafia which is now literally running and ruining Chile, no matter which way you view it.

## Ideology

The "free market," which is what this economic model is called, essentially involves freeing prices and freezing salaries. In order to enforce this policy its authors are outlawing strikes, trade unions, and other forms of working-class organization. To

James Petras is co-author with Morris Morley of *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* (Monthly Review Press, 1975). This article is a revised version of a talk given on September 11, 1976, at a meeting in Washington, D.C., organized by a coalition of Chile solidarity organizations.



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encourage the free flow of capital, they lower tariff barriers, dismantle state-owned enterprises, and above all cut back on public spending and investment. This strategy is ostensibly intended to reduce inflation and increase production on the one hand, and on the other to produce stability, competition, and efficiency in the economy, which eventually, we are told, will lead to growth, higher income, and employment for all.

That is, in a nutshell, the ideology that is mouthed daily by the controlled press and other media, and by the governmental palace in Chile. Because we must uncover the basis on which the junta has attempted to legitimize its seizure of power, we must first consider the economic realities.

### Socio-Economic Realities

Inflation continues virtually unabated. From September to December 1973, the rate of inflation on an annual basis was 343 percent; from January to December 1974, 376 percent; from January to December 1975, 340 percent; during the first half of 1976 the annual rate was 269 percent. These are record figures. They certainly do not reflect the containment of inflation or achievement of the stability which the regime claims to be pursuing. If you add up all this, it comes out that since the coup prices have increased by anywhere between 10 and 20 percent per month.

In addition to inflation, the economy has regressed on many levels. Industrial production declined by 23 percent in 1974-1975. GNP declined between 10 and 14 percent in 1975. Agricultural production declined in 1975 by 7.7 percent; it did not increase by 4.3 percent, as the regime claimed. Production of wheat, a basic item in the Chilean diet, was down in 1976 by an estimated 40 percent. Fertilizer, which is needed to produce any increases in agricultural production, was down 50 percent. Salaries and wages are estimated to have declined anywhere from 35 percent to 60 percent of what they were prior to the coup. In regard to industrial capacity, if we look at various sectors of the economy we find, for example, that textiles are operating at 45 percent of capacity; shoes, 44 percent; furniture, 52 percent; glass, 13 percent; and construc-

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tion, 35 percent. We can safely conclude from these figures that not only is there economic chaos, as is well established by the inflationary rate, but the country is going through a major depression. The junta projected 23,000 automobiles for 1975, but only 6,500 were in fact produced. There is, however, a logic to this system (at least for the rich). In 1972, the top 5 percent received 25 percent of total income; in 1975 they received 50 percent. Wage and salary workers in 1972 received 64 percent, now they receive 38 percent. Under the socialist government, unemployment in 1973 was 3 percent; in Chile today, very conservative estimates put it at 20 to 25 percent of the labor force. If we translate this into families and households, it means that there are three million people in Chile today without the means to live—without a salary or wage to buy food or clothing. The construction industry alone has an unemployment rate of 35 to 40 percent. We can conclude that the economic performance of the junta has been an unmitigated disaster even from the point of view of their claims of what they were aiming to accomplish.

### Public Policy: From Public Ownership to Private Monopolies

The upper-class bias of the regime is evident in other areas of public policy. We can see this in very graphic terms in the transfer of firms from public ownership to private monopolies. The state in Chile (not just under the socialist government but under previous governments as well) had created a number of public enterprises which provided a certain dynamic to the economy in steel and in a whole series of other sectors. These enterprises have been taken from the public sector and handed over, at bargain-basement prices, to the private sector. Who can buy these enterprises? Not José González off the street, not your average wage or salaried worker. It is the wealthy classes who are gaining more and more power. And this, we are told, is in the name of "free competition." Dismantling the state sector, we are told, is necessary in order to encourage free competition. In fact, one of the biggest buyers of these state enterprises is an outfit called the Banco Hipotecario de Chile, which has stakes today in all sectors of the economy—in finance, insurance, mining, and manufacturing. In the durable goods

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sector it controls 80 percent of all production. This is the way to create a "free market." In its blind attack against public enterprise the junta doesn't even see that there is no competitive sector. There is a monopoly sector, and what is taken from the state is turned over to the big private monopolies. The same pattern is evident in agriculture: the reconcentration of land into the hands of the big landlords and the reversal of the agrarian reform. Of the 5,809 farms which were expropriated under the Christian Democratic and socialist governments (1964-1973), 3,369 have been returned to the big landowners. That is, 58 percent of the farms have been forcibly seized, taken away from the peasants, and given back to the old landlords who were responsible, after all, for the fifty years of agricultural backwardness which characterized Chilean agriculture prior to the Allende period.

What are some of the physiological consequences of unemployment, depressed salaries, and rising prices? They have led to malnutrition which affects 62 percent of the children in Santiago, while 50 to 75 percent of the adults in Chile today lack the necessary caloric intake.

Popular social organizations along with the capacity for social mobilization have been prohibited by the state. Trade unions, cooperatives, community organizations have been purged and put under the control of state-appointed functionaries. Strikes, assemblies, and protests have been banned. This system has been sustained by the torture that has been so graphically reported in the news media. When William Simon went to Chile and 150 prisoners were freed, it appeared in all the newspapers. What was not reported was that the week before the junta had arrested 300 people, including many of those who were released. Furthermore, among those said to be released were many who had already been freed. Nor has there been any let-up in the rate of arrests since Simon's visit, or since Kissinger made his "human rights" speech. We can conclude that these visits and speeches were an attempt by Simon, Kissinger, and Pinochet to put on a show to lead world public opinion to think that something different was happening in Chile. But this theatrical production has fooled no one except those who want to be fooled.

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### The Regime and the Middle Class

In Chile today, there is widespread bankruptcy among small businessmen, impoverishment of many white-collar workers, and an exodus of professionals. This is ironic, because during the Allende period many of these people, in their dementia, in their irrational moments, went into the streets screaming about communism and how it would destroy them, even as they walked out of their often prosperous homes and shops. Today it is the junta which is impoverishing them and destroying them. Sixteen percent of the doctors have left Chile since 1974. Businesses have been squeezed by credit freezes, by lack of capital, unavailability of loans, and most of all by the low purchasing power of the masses. Their owners have no way of protesting today under the fascist regime. Massive white-collar unemployment affects tens of thousands who have been laid off from the public services. All of this occurs in the name of the so-called free-market economy. And it is this combination of lack of opportunity and the closing down of many businesses which is forcing engineers and technicians to leave the country.

### The Beneficiaries of the Regime

What is keeping the junta going, what is keeping it afloat? Who are the social and economic beneficiaries of the junta's policies? First—the international bankers who are picking up $717 million in interest and debt repayments this year alone. As one international banker told me, "We lend to Chile because whatever problems they have down there"—those little things like torture—"we're first on the list to get paid before anyone else." This $717 million includes $238 million in interest and the rest is paying back principal. This amounts to 36 percent of all of Chile's exports this year. The second main beneficiaries are the multinational corporations. Firestone, Dow Chemical, ITT are all back in Chile, recapturing enterprises which were nationalized. New concessions are being made in the areas of copper exploitation, petroleum, and timber. The terms of investment are very lucrative. There are no controls on profits. Remittances are based on free exchange. Whatever the foreign enterprises are looking for, the junta is offering. They have a captive labor force—no labor problems in Chile. The

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bosses are allowed to do whatever they want, whenever they want. And they have been doing it. Massive layoffs and intensification of work at the point of production. They are also engaged in buying up national state enterprises; one of the most lucrative ventures coming up for sale is Celulosa Araúco, which is a big paper and pulp-processing plant previously under state ownership. The third beneficiaries are the monopoly capitalists and the financial oligarchy inside of Chile. The exploitative relationships aren't just confined to external forces, because foreign investors and bankers have found partners engaged in the same operations. Many of the monopolies are setting up financial houses to engage in speculative activities, lending money at exorbitant rates. And they are transferring a good deal of their capital from productive activity to the export-import business, increasing their profits while increasing unemployment. These financial houses have sprung up, many of them promoted by individuals who are known to have close connections with the military. And there is the fourth beneficiary of this regime: the military elite. The generals and colonels who have enriched themselves from the public treasury, who have increased their salaries, who have given themselves an unlimited budget, and who have appointed their relatives to key positions.

In sum, the social sectors on which the junta depends —the financiers, the multinationals, the banks—are the very ones who are the main beneficiaries of the junta and the main instrumentalities of the inflation. By increasing profits—through price gougings, not through increases in production; through speculation, not through innovation; and through loans, not through investments—they generate the inflationary spiral. They are reaping enormous incomes but they are also fueling the fires of inflation and promoting the decline of the economy. It is these social classes to which the junta is tied that prohibit it from taking any decisive measures which could slow down or break the inflationary spiral.

Now, what are some of the political consequences of this economic strategy? The once broad support for the junta among the middle class is disintegrating. While the CIA played an important role in setting up the conditions for the overthrow of

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Allende and was involved in planning the economic programs afterwards, it was the Chilean petty bourgeoisie that went out in the streets. The Christian Democrats and the National Party created the chaos that gave the military the pretext for taking power. Many of these individuals today wish they hadn't. The critics of the junta include many conservative political and industrial leaders; for example, a former President, Eduardo Frei, was a very important factor in the whole program of destabilization of the democratically elected government. The leader of the industrial association, Orlando Saenz, is reputed to have gone, during the Allende period, to Brazil and Venezuela and picked up some of the cash used to finance the boycotts and lockouts that tumbled the government. These individuals today are in the forefront within the conservative camp, attacking the policies of the junta. They are attacking the junta because it is destroying the Chilean business class. They hoped for a change, they said, but not this kind of a change. This regime undermines their own existence, and these middle-class groups today are hoping for a conservative coup which will displace Pinochet and his clique. But at the same time the middle-class oppositionists maintain that the working class cannot play any decisive role in the struggle, and they keep the workers at arm's length. What they want, in other words, is a coup to displace Pinochet and at the same time gain the confidence and support of Kissinger and Ford. This middle-class opposition is always closer to the dictatorship than it is to the popular resistance. Today it is increasingly discontented, but it is increasingly impotent.

The loss of support from the broad strata of middle-class and business people has narrowed the basis of the regime and reflects itself in three waves of repression. The continuing purge has become an institutional feature of the regime. Purge I, 1973-1974 and continuing today: all leftists, all democratic trade unionists, all militants from the peasant and student movements. Purge II: dissident Christian Democrats, church and professional people who attempted to speak out against the indecencies and arbitrariness of the regime. And finally, Purge III: in which even military rivals to Pinochet's personal rule—e.g., General Bonilla, General Arellano, who themselves were in-

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timately involved in the massacres—end up being purged for not being 101 percent with Pinochet. What this means, in effect, is that Pinochet has consolidated a personal dictatorship. He has done this on the basis of the suppression of the mass movement through tortures and massive imprisonments. He has done it through the growth and penetration of all sectors of society by the secret police, known as the DINA, with some twenty thousand members active in all areas of Chilean society and abroad in embassies. Bernardo Leighton, a former Vice President of Chile, was the victim of an assassination attempt in Italy; and General Prats, the former chief of staff of the Chilean army, was assassinated in Buenos Aires. Orlando Letelier, former ambassador to Washington, assassinated on September 21, 1976, in Washington, is the latest victim. DINA, the secret police, has one agent for every 250 Chilean adults and has become one of the principal props of the dictatorship. The third basis is the purges in the military: the forced retirements by Pinochet of 18 of the 26 generals who carried out the coup, and their replacement by handpicked Pinochet men—that is, loyal stooges who will do whatever Pinochet tells them to do because they owe their positions to him. The fourth basis, but not the least, is the massive support from the United States and the U.S.-influenced international banks. Robert McNamara at the World Bank has given the dictatorship $133 million; the International Monetary Fund, under the prodding of its U.S. delegates, $420 million. The Inter-American Development Bank, again with strong pressure from the United States, $400 million. First National City and Manufacturers Hanover Trust handed the junta $680 million at a time when they said there was no money for New York City schools. They were giving these millions to a government presiding over a 380 percent rate of inflation and 25 percent unemployment. The economic crisis in New York was paradise compared to what was going on in Chile, but the profits were fatter in Latin America. Beyond that, Pinochet received support from other Latin American dictatorial governments, principally Brazil, to the tune of $120 million, and Japan and some of the European countries chipped in another $200 million. The total sum is $2 billion, more or less. This has sustained the dictatorship. The combined

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weight of the secret police, U.S. financial support, and big business has consolidated Pinochet's position. The opposition by the bourgeoisie—its efforts to challenge the military elite without changing the system—have failed.

### Chile and Latin America

But the Chilean experience has significance far beyond its borders, for the whole of Latin America and the U.S. corporate world, because what has happened in Chile is happening throughout Latin America. Both the economic strategy that I described earlier and the type of political regime—a brutal police state—which the United States helped set up in Chile serve as a model for what U.S. policy-makers and their corporate cohorts would like to see in the rest of Latin America. In Argentina since the March 1976 coup, 3,000 workers and students have been assassinated; there have been over a hundred thousand political firings; 30,000 political prisoners; concentration camps. All the while, José Martínez de Hoz, Argentina's Minister of Economy, says "the real driving force of the economy is private enterprise." After, of course, you have driven down wages and increased profits, and after you have mounted a police state to protect the privileged elite who benefit from this "free-enterprise" system. The police state operates in order to permit the so-called free-market philosophy to take hold. The increase in prices, the freezing of wages, the attempt to dismantle the state sector, to provide the private sector with a whole series of subsidies and concessions: all of these privileges for the upper class are described by Martínez as stabilizing measures. And what is the U.S. reaction to what is going on in Latin America? Take Argentina for example: Alex Perry, head of a U.S. cement company in Argentina and of the American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina, says about the dictatorship and its policies: "If the sort of progress we have had until now continues, I think we will see existing companies firming up plans for reinvestment by October." No mention of the thousands jailed, tortured, and killed. In Bolivia, in Uruguay, the pattern is similar. A police-state regime reduces wages, increases profits, encourages big business with new concessions and sells off state enterprises. Under the pressure of the

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U.S. multinationals and financial houses, the Peruvians and Ecuadorians, once known as the nationalist regimes in the area, also begin repressing workers and meeting the terms of the bankers and foreign investors. Brazil, of course, continues the same pattern it has adhered to over the past 12 years. *Business Week* (August 9, 1976) discussed these developments in its feature article, with a big picture on the front cover: Latin America with its doors open. It said, "Latin America opens the doors to foreign investment again." Forgetting to mention that those "Latin Americans" who are opening the doors are running torture chambers 24 hours a day; that they represent a small fraction of the country; that they were aided to power by the Pentagon, the State Department, and the CIA; and that they were opposed by the bulk of their peoples, and only stay in power with the aid of the military dictatorship and the sophisticated arms of the United States. It is true, as *Business Week* states: "There is good news coming out of Latin America for U.S. and other foreign companies with a stake in this vast region." "Major countries," it says, "are opening their doors wider to private enterprise. Multinational executives consider the region to be one of the world's major investment opportunities." Andre Van Dam, head of a U.S. consortium, states: "It's all there. Protein, minerals, forests, water." Adds *Business Week,* "a fast expanding population of 300 million and a combined GNP of $220 billion." The Chilean model has become the U.S. model for Latin America. It is the model for exploiting the continent securely and profitably. Why did Kissinger and Simon, and a host of other functionaries who pretended to condemn the cruelty of the junta while praising its economic policies, fail to effect any significant change? Because the "economic freedoms" they praised the regime for promoting require dictatorial control, in order to offset the massive popular opposition growing out of the social and economic effects resulting from the economic policies. "Free economy" means monopoly takeovers, foreign exploitation, concentration of economic power, and a growing police state to protect the rich and repress the poor.

Chile has, then, vast continental implications. The Chilean dictatorship has been in the vanguard of Latin America in the

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handing over of property to the monopolies. The Chilean dictatorship has been the detonator of a new brand of Latin American neocolonialism, opening the door to foreign investment, unmaking the Andean Pact and other regional nationalist economic programs, and heightening the pressure on neighboring countries to follow the same road. We have had the awesome nightmare of the Chileanization of Latin America under the auspices of Kissinger and Ford. Opening the doors to foreign investment means closing the jail doors on many millions.

What is our future perspective? What are the perspectives for Chile and Latin America? If we immerse ourselves in the here and now—or worse, if we lose our global and historical perspective—we can be led to gloomy and erroneous views. Compare Latin America with Africa. Africa during the period from 1965 to 1974 went through a similarly gloomy period beginning with the overthrow of Nkrumah; the overthrow of the progressives in Mali and Algeria; the early victories of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique; and the South African regime's smashing of the resistance movement of its own black majority. All of these regimes looked invulnerable, and there were of course those who saw it that way, who saw Joe Mobutu, the protégé of the State Department, secure in the Congo, Ian Smith setting up his little racist state in Rhodesia, Selassie in Ethiopia, appearing to be eternal and consolidating his control over Eritrea. It looked to many commentators as if Africa were condemned to decades of colonial and neocolonial misrule and agony.

Yet in a period of two years we have seen this trend definitely reversed. Successful social revolutions have taken place in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique, in which the combined forces of Portugal, Zaire, South Africa, and the United States were defeated. There are rising revolts in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and in the very heartland of apartheid. Racism in South Africa has its back to the wall. New revolutionary currents are astir in North Africa, and the Eritrean revolutionary movement is on the ascent. The same pattern of foreign economic exploitation, concentration of income, and dictatorial rule from which have sprung the successful movements in Africa are present today in Latin America.

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The victories in Africa and Asia are interrelated. Vietnam weakened the intervention capacity of the United States and facilitated Angola's victory, vindicating Che Guevara, who called for the creation of two, three, many Vietnams. How wrong were the empiricists and the publicists and the vulgar pragmatists and the scholastics of all shades who thought that Che's death reflected a mistaken strategy, that internationalism was a romantic dream! What can they say after the splendid example of solidarity between Cuba and the Angolan people's army?

Today's combat in Latin America, in Chile, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, will produce the defeats of imperialism tomorrow. Once more, imperialism will be overextended, as its leader extends its tentacles to the $200-billion market and the 300 million people of Latin America. And as it intervenes, a new revolt on a continent-wide basis will be detonated. Just as the imperial victories of today in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, produced a series of open-door client regimes, this same homogenizing process is producing in each country a common set of contradictions. Impoverishing the masses. Depressing the lower middle class. Multiplying unemployment in the city and the countryside where a massive sub-proletariat is growing. Breaking down the mediating institutions of parliamentary democracy, providing no option short of revolutionary struggle. Based on the minimal demand for an adequate standard of living, the masses stand today as the only force ready and willing to fight the client regimes.

In this context, the anti-dictatorial struggle comes face to face with one of the prime movers and benefactors of these regimes—U.S. foreign investors and their state. The struggle for democracy becomes converted into a struggle against imperialism, and since imperialism is the prime supporter of local capitalists, without whom they cannot exist, with whom they must compete, the anti-imperialist struggle leads directly to the struggle for socialism. The bourgeois opposition is no prime mover. The struggle for democracy in Chile has broader and deeper implications. At the continental level, it can be the detonator of a new, mass revolutionary struggle, and at the level of the internal struggle, it can lead directly to the victory of socialism.

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# UNIVERSALITY AND CULTURAL SPHERES

BY SAMIR AMIN

Models of social organization, like the ideological formulations which sustain them, have a universal scope (vocation), no doubt for the first time in history. This applies both to capitalist models and to those which concern the postcapitalist future, socialist or not. Clearly, there are today three consistent models which claim this universal validity: the North American, the Soviet, and the Chinese.

The first model, rooted in the history of capitalist formation in Northwestern Europe, has, in the United States, developed virtually to its logical limit the correspondence between the functional economic requirements of the capitalist mode of production and their ideological and political expression. The reason this mode claims universal validity is that the capitalist system has itself become the first global social system.

Whatever we may think of this model and its internal con-

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tradictions, we must concede that it still has immense strength. In Europe and Japan, it has for twenty-five years exerted a fascinating attraction, not only on their ruling classes, but also on the broad masses of the workers, thus demonstrating the hegemony of the capitalist ideology over the whole society. The bourgeoisies of the Third World are not aware of any other objective; they diligently copy the Western consumption model, their schools reproduce the models of labor organization which accompany Western technologies.

The other two models claim to draw their inspiration from Marxism and to have established a socialist social order. Yet they are very different, in that the Soviet model shares with the Western the idea that consumption, technology, and labor organization models are "neutral" in relation to the social system, that they stem from the requirements of the development of the productive forces. It views the question of capitalism or socialism only in relation to the (private or public) ownership of the means of production. In contrast, the Chinese model denies that socialism can take over from capitalism its models of consumption and labor organization.

These two models also exert a very powerful attraction outside their geographical borders. The Soviet model continues to inspire important labor organizations in Europe; it also attracts large sectors of the nationalist petty bourgeoisies in the Third World. The Chinese model inspires in varying degrees the vanguard movements both in the West, where it is connected with the "self-management" movement, and in certain Third World circles, where it has some impact on the young intellectuals and students, and sometimes on the masses.

No current of thought and action in the world can stand aloof from the choices offered by these three models. The question therefore is to determine which is likely to triumph universally, and under what conditions. The answer outlined here is intended to go beyond the scope of traditional political controversy. I will therefore begin with an analysis of the relations between the economic base and the ideological superstructure, which is the crucial issue and the decisive contribution of historical materialism. This analysis cannot be made in the

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abstract, ignoring history; it must deal *also* with the problems of the transformation of the superstructures which belonged to previous social formations, and their adaptation (or non-adaptation) both to the expansion of capitalism and to that of the so-called "socialist" regimes. These problems concern both the West, whose ideology clearly did not arise out of a void, and the Third World, in which the "vestiges" of precapitalist production and ideological systems are still clearly visible.

The essential framework of European capitalist ideology was defined by the European philosophy of the Enlightenment. This philosophy is based on a tradition of mechanistic materialism which postulates a series of chains of specific causal determinations. The chief of these is that science and technology, by their (autonomous) progress, determine every sphere of social life, transforming social relations in the process. The class struggle is expelled from history and replaced by a mechanical determination imposing itself as an external force, as a law of nature. This primitive materialism, which is often regarded as opposed to idealism, is in fact its twin: they are two sides of the same coin. Whether it is said that humanity is guided on the path of progress by God (Providence) or that this function is fulfilled by science, it comes to exactly the same thing: conscious, nonalienated society and social classes disappear from the picture. That is why the ideological expression of this materialism is often religious (e.g., the Freemasons or the Supreme Being); that is why the two ideologies go easily hand in hand in the United States—primitive materialism governs social behavior (and provides its "scientific" explanation), while religious idealism remains intact "in the soul." Bourgeois "science" has never transcended this primitive materialism because it conditions the reproduction of alienation, enabling capital to exploit labor.

Marxism is not just the most modern materialism. Because it combines materialism with dialectics, it stands outside the terrain of the classical materialism/idealism debate and transcends both by "demystifying" them, i.e., by revealing their function in the class struggle. Marxism produced the basic concepts which led to this transcendence (modes of production,

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social formations, productive forces, relations of production, superstructure) and used them to elucidate specific characteristics of the relations, in social reproduction, between the ultimately determinant economic base and the sometimes dominant, sometimes subordinate superstructure. Historical materialism for the first time analyzes history in nonideological terms, provides the methods for understanding the nature of social alienation, and thus breaks radically with the tradition of European philosophy. Thus, although Marxism came into being within the European cultural sphere, it transcended the debates of that society (is capitalism the final embodiment of reason or a still imperfect stage on that path?), thereby acquiring its universal validity.

This validity is nevertheless continually called into question by the vulgar reduction of Marxism to economism throughout advanced capitalist society, including its working-class movements. This "vulgar Marxism" takes over from the primitive materialist philosophy of the Enlightenment two postulates which it formulates in a language ostensibly Marxist, but emptied of Marxist content. The first is that the development of the productive forces (autonomous force) determines the changes in the relations of production (effect). This is the argument of all revisionisms. Yet, history shows that it is the class struggle which alters the relations of production and thus makes possible the potential development of the productive forces. The second is that the superstructure reflects the requirements of the economic base. This simple argument ignores the specific features of the base/superstructure relations pertaining to every mode of production, and the relative roles of base and superstructure in the overall reproduction of each society.

These pseudo-Marxists bring us back to the old notion that society is governed by "laws" (forces external to itself). Historical materialism thus becomes a particular field of action in which the "laws" of "dialectical materialism" embrace both society and nature. Having reached this point, we are right back to bourgeois philosophy and religion. Engels' unfortunate attempt to posit a "dialectics of nature" reflects the pressure exerted on the European labor movement by the hegemony of

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bourgeois ideology. It was in line with the spirit of the time—positivist scientism, Kautskyism, etc.—that Stalin was to transform this rough sketch into a catechism. In distorting Marxism, moreover, this reductionism also gave it a Western-centered character which it shares with the ideology of capitalism.

The philosophy of the Enlightenment implies a teleology: the whole history of Europe was a necessary preparation for the birth of capitalism to the extent that Christianity, viewed as a European religion, was more favorable than other religions to the emergence of the individual and his/her capacity to dominate nature.

It may be useful here to consider the significance and the function of some groups of religions: the religion of ancient Egypt, Confucianism, Hinduism, and the "Semitic" religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam).

Religions settle two sets of problems: those concerning the relations between people and nature and those concerning the relations among people (the social classes). Although what predominated at the very beginning of the religious idea was doubtless the domination of nature, the resulting religious alienation was nevertheless made to serve the reproduction of the social hierarchies. Both in the Egyptian religion and in Confucianism this second function of religion already clearly constitutes their main dimension. There were myths concerning natural phenomena and the magical means of placing them at the service of humanity (for example, the flooding of the Nile and the Huang Ho), but these were integrated in a broader philosophy geared to the justification of the social order. This transfer of the center of gravity of alienation shows how highly developed the productive forces were in these two societies which succeeded in mastering irrigation.

The religion of ancient Egypt is a construct remarkably consistent with the requirements of production in a full-fledged tributary mode of production. What is striking in this religion is a kind of cynicism according to which the forces of Evil (Seth) prevail over the forces of Good. To what does this picture of society (actually quite realistic) correspond? Is not its function to justify the heavy and fully transparent tribute paid by the

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toiling masses for the benefit of the ruling classes? Religion here is perfectly attuned to the requirements of the tribute-paying mode; this shows that ideology fulfills a dominant function in social reproduction.

Confucianism is a formally different expression of this same type of relation between ideology and the full-fledged, Chinese, tribute-based mode. What we have here is a civil philosophy with religious overtones, which attributes to the social hierarchy the character of a permanent human necessity based on an implicit sociopsychology which looks fairly commonplace to us.

On the other hand, the Hindu and Semitic religions were attempting to address the relations between people and nature. Faced with a serious threat from a largely uncontrolled nature, primitive people only had a choice between two attitudes: to identify with nature or to deny it. Hinduism adopted the first attitude which, by reducing humankind to a part of nature, makes its powerlessness tolerable. The Semitic religions, on the other hand, coming from the arid regions of the Middle East, asserted the original separation of people from nature, the superiority of humanity—the image of God—and the subjection of nature which has no soul and is reduced to being the object of human action. Both contain potentially the subsequent development of a systematic attempt to tame nature, but at the initial stages of the Semitic religions, this assertion was merely ideal. In the absence of any real means of acting on nature, the appeal was made to God the protector (of the Jewish chosen people, in fact). This decisive choice was inherited by Christianity, although its development within a complex, advanced, and crisis-ridden society led it to extend considerably the second dimension of religion, that concerning social relations. The same applies to Islam, especially since it shouldered the burden of organizing a new empire.

Christianity, one of the essential components of the European cultural sphere, is thus deeply rooted in a remote past outside that sphere. We would like to draw an important lesson from this observation: ideologies formed at a particular time in history may have subsequent destinies very different from their

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original vocation. Did not Hinduism, for instance, constitute a very powerful element of resistance to the development of a full-fledged tribute-based mode of production, of which India provides examples of abortive attempts? Is it not significant that the most consistent attempt in this direction was made by the Moslem sovereigns of that subcontinent?

On the one hand, since they were highly consistent with the requirements of the tribute-based mode, Egyptian religion and Confucianism were forces incapable of flexibility, and either remained unchanged—accompanying the survival of the full-fledged tribute-based mode—or were totally eradicated. It was not until China, shaken from outside by capitalism, superseded it by its socialist revolution that Confucianism finally began to lose ground, particularly from the time of the Cultural Revolution. As regards Egypt, the Pharaonic ideology has largely survived the official Christianity and Islam of that country; this persistence explains and is explained by the persistence of the tribute-based mode, giving Egyptian society its particular features in the Arab Moslem world of yesterday and today. In this sense, capitalism did not prove capable of destroying the ideology of the tribute-based mode. Probably, as in the case of China, only socialism will eventually be able to do this.

On the other hand, Christianity and Islam have great flexibility rooted in their original position regarding the selections between dominant humankind and dominated nature. It therefore appears quite wrong, for example, to make Christianity or Islam the ideology of feudalism. There may have been here and there, such ideologies, but they have also been the ideology of the merchant empires (the Arab world of the Middle Ages, the Italian towns and those of the Hanseatic League, Atlantic Europe from the sixteenth century onward, etc.), just as Christianity has also become the ideology of capitalism. The speeches made about "Islam and progress" (implying the rational spirit, individual initiative, capitalism, and so on) are equally unconvincing, for on this plane Islam, like Christianity, can adapt itself to everything. Nevertheless, both Christianity and Islam will remain obstacles to socialism, since, like all religions, they convey profound alienations.

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The formation of capitalist ideology, in fact, went through different stages. The first was the adaptation of Christianity (especially with the rise of Protestantism); but that was only a first stage, confined to certain areas of the European cultural sphere. It is because capitalism developed particularly early in England that the bourgeois revolution there took a religious and therefore particularly alienated form. Being master of the real world, the English bourgeoisie did not feel the need to develop a philosophy; it could be satisfied with an empiricism which corresponded to primitive materialism and which was sufficient to ensure the development of the productive forces. The counterpart of the development of alienated English political economy was this empiricism which took the place of a philosophy. But Protestantism did not fulfill the same functions on the continent of Europe because the development of capitalism there was not sufficiently mature. The second wave in the formation of capitalist ideology was therefore expressed more directly in philosophical and political terms. Thus Protestantism is not, any more than Catholicism, the specific ideology of capitalism.

It was a long time before this specific ideology gradually emerged from the earlier forms which had ensured the transition to capitalism. Its content was economistic alienation. Its expression—supply and demand considered as external forces imposing themselves on society—reflected its mystified and mystifying nature. Having reached this stage of its elaboration, the ideology of capitalism abandoned its previous forms or emptied them of their content: the assertion of the individual gave way to that of the organization. This ideology has a potentially universal force which accompanies the worldwide extension of the capitalist mode of production, because it is perfectly consistent with the basic requirement of this mode: the law of profit.

Freed from the teleological and Eurocentric vision of history, we can now understand the nature of the break with the philosophy of the Enlightenment which Marxism represents.

We have, on the one hand, Enlightenment philosophy, whose remote origins lie in the Semitic religious vision, thus opening the way to the domination of nature through the development

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of science and technology. This philosophy, whether it takes the idealist form of the Christian religions or that of the mechanistic materialism of the Greeks, of the Renaissance, or of the eighteenth century, nonetheless leads to the idea of linear progress, parallel on all levels and determined by the irresistible progress of science. This philosophy leads necessarily to domination by the commodity value which must penetrate all aspects of social life and subject them to its own logic. The themes of science, technology, and organization as ideologies find their place here. At the same time, this philosophy pushes to an extreme absurdity its original assertion concerning the separation of people and nature. It is, from this point of view, an absolute anti-Hinduism. It wants nature to be treated as a thing, and even to be destroyed, thereby threatening the very survival of humankind, as the themes of the environment and ecology are beginning to remind us.

In contrast to this "universal barbarism," historical materialism is an alternative vision based on a qualitative break which transcends the frame of reference of previous alienated choices such as idealism or primitive materialism, fusion with nature or negation of nature. The prospect is clear here; it is one of self-management extended to all humankind (in the "developed" world as well as in the world which is not developed today). As a condition of "disalienation," this control by humankind over our own future, at all levels, compels us to supersede exchange value.

The universal scope of the commodity ideology confronts that of historical materialism. In today's world, the level and forms of development of capitalism on the one hand, and the form of its socialist contestation on the other hand, as well as the actual division of the world into different spheres of civilization (European and non-European, Moslem, Hindu, etc.) are combined in a complex way, so that we need to study concretely the relations between the base (whether developed or not) and the superstructures in each of these spheres. In this connection, we can distinguish, as a first approximation, six spheres among which our present world is divided.

The European sphere of developed capitalism (Western

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Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) still retains some of its original heterogeneities (unequal levels of development and characteristics of social formations and class alliances, predominance of Catholic or Protestant religious traditions and of the different, more or less empirical currents of the philosophy of the Enlightenment). The fact remains that in the United States the specific ideology of capitalism, economistic commodity alienation, appears in its purest form—organization and technology as ideology. The United States constitutes the model toward which Europe is tending. The ideology of the dominant class is in this case the dominant ideology of the society. In its social-democratic form, revisionist Marxism expresses here the same essential content in the working class, in relation to the imperialist phenomenon.

The non-European sphere of developed capitalism is virtually limited to Japan. Japan is frequently the subject of contradictory comments: it is said to have lost its national culture and retained only an empty shell; or, on the contrary, Japan supposedly juxtaposes or even integrates its own system of values (e.g., paternalism in the firm) with the requirements of the law of profit. In fact, Japan acceded directly to the ready-made ideology of capitalism in its mature form of commodity alienation, because it did not go through the transition period of bourgeois individualism expressed in the transformation of European Christianity. Capitalist Japan followed another society, an immature tribute-based society of the feudal type.

The ideology of this society was partly that of China, the mother of the regional civilization, although the immature character of the Japanese tribute-based mode prevented it from adopting this ideology in its totality. Is not the relative success of Buddhism evidence of this? Buddhism is in fact an anti-Hinduist reaction similar to the Semitic religions in its assertion of the separation of people and nature. Buddhism failed in India, and in China it did not succeed in undermining the Chinese ideology. Yet it was successful in Japan. But because they were not European, the components of the precapitalist Japanese ideology were more difficult to integrate into the new capitalist ideology. The latter mainly took over the specifically Chinese components of the earlier ideology, because the very

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advanced capitalist mode, corresponding to the world of the organization and "one-dimensional" man, links up with the tribute-based mode, the transparent extortion of the surplus reappearing with the centralization of capital. Hence Japan could evolve in a way which would bring it nearer to the Soviet world.

The European sphere of so-called socialism, of what is in fact a new class mode of production (the "Soviet mode," to give it a name) shares with that of the capitalist West both the history of its formation and the essential features of commodity alienation. This sphere derives from the revisionist version of Marxism, and has developed what is probably the most advanced of the possible models which could follow capitalism linearly, being in line with the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The United States and Japan are tending toward this model, and Europe is following suit, although with more difficulty.

The European sphere of underdeveloped capitalism—in practice, Latin America—presents a specific contradiction. Since it is underdeveloped, Latin America cannot accede to the model of mature central capitalism, owing to the very fact of imperialist domination. There is, however, a very strong danger that large sectors of these societies may continue to cherish the illusion of a possible evolution toward either an American or a Soviet model. The reason for this is the European colonial origin of Latin America, a colonization which not only imported these same essential aspects of the European ideology in transition toward capitalism, but also maintained living links which led the ideological currents of Europe to pursue their development on that continent.

In the sub-area in which Spanish colonization integrated organized Indian populations (Mexico, Guatemala, Andean countries), the Indian "reserves" are frequently contrasted with the areas of a European character. This contrast, based on surveys of ethnic types, languages, and other social characteristics (religious myths, family organizations, etc.), is in keeping with a typically colonial ideological vision which concludes (on the basis of the criteria adopted) that there is a gradual "Europeanization." In fact, the broad masses are still resisting this "Europeanization" (even if this is a passive resistance which is yielding in some spheres, as in that of language). These

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working-class masses are in the very large majority, not only in the rural areas, but also in the towns. (The acceleration of migration to the urban centers has changed their character which, not very long ago, was essentially colonial, i.e., Spanish.) This opposition is expressed primarily by the refusal of the masses to participate in the debates concerning "modernization." At the other pole, the ruling classes—in the widest sense—have no doubt as to their "Europeanness" which, however, is cultural more than ethnic, since the renewal of these classes side by side with the development of capitalism was sometimes effected by the absorption of popular elements. The gulf between these ruling classes and the people is therefore widened by this double unintegrated cultural heritage. In Mexico, for instance, the contemporary revolutionary movement (urban dweller, worker, student) has no roots in the peasant (and therefore "Indian") revolution of 1910. In Bolivia, Trotskyism, the dominant factor in the labor movement, ignores the (Indian) peasantry which continues to proclaim its hatred of colonial Spain in its songs.

In the sub-area in which colonization was based on black slavery (the West Indies and traditional Brazil), there is a similar gulf between the culture of the people (largely black) and that of the ruling classes (irrespective of their color), who are always attracted by European culture, a relic of the colonial mentality.

These problems do not exist in the Southern Cone (including southern Brazil) with its almost entirely European population. The emigrants who came here, like others who went to the United States or Australia to make their fortunes, are at present experiencing a kind of internal rage at having missed a development which could have turned them into the equivalents of Australians. The fascist style of São Paulo reflects this frustration and the will to destroy at all costs the old Brazil. Peronism shares many of these attitudes.

It will be difficult to understand the repeated failures of the mass movements in Latin America as long as people refuse to take into consideration the profound relationship at the ideological level between "Europeanness" and capitalism. Latin America has not yet come to grips with its colonial origin. The

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absence of Maoist-type thought on that continent may well be largely a consequence of this contradiction.

The African and Asian peoples of the non-European sphere of underdeveloped capitalism do not have these problems. It is true that here, as in Latin America, the bourgeoisies favor the consumption model and the lifestyle of European capitalism. But the illusion of "development" is considerably less strong here. Despite the extremely wide range of cultures in this vast sphere, despite the cultural alienation of the "elites," there is a distinct feeling that the development of capitalism is destroying their personality and uprooting them from their past. There is no doubt that since Bandung, the great Afro-Asian consolidation has evoked a response among the peoples, and today it is here, in Africa and Asia, that Maoism—in the broadest sense—finds its most powerful echo. It is no accident that the revolutionary forces won out in Cambodia but were defeated in Chile. China and communist East Asia constitute a particular sphere, owing to the fact that these are perhaps the only places where Marxism has been successful in taking root in the minds of the people.

The problem of the transition to worldwide socialism compels us to become aware of these considerations. For the developed world as a whole, the main issue is this: How can we extend the sphere of use value (reduce the field of commodity relations) without making the productive forces regress? Inasmuch as the "traditional" use values have already disappeared, buried under the development of commodity relations, we have to invent a culture which is likely to be almost completely new.

For the underdeveloped world as a whole, the main issue is different: How can we develop the productive forces without letting the commodity relations gain ground? Since the traditional use values still exist here, it will be possible to build a bridge between the past and the future. But this does not in any way mean that these societies must inherit precapitalist ideologies. On the contrary, the transition to socialism implies a radical break with this heritage in Asia and Africa, just as it implies abandoning the "European dream" in Latin America. The Third World has so far been living in a very particular

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situation, in which all these contradictions are expressed. It is a situation of an "obstructed transition," from which only the countries of communist East Asia have freed themselves. This situation is reflected in the sterile opposition between an impossible attempt at bourgeois modernization, made by the dominant classes who are relays of imperialism, and a popular resistance which is still trying to preserve precapitalist relations. This resistance may be very strong where the oppressed peoples are of non-European culture, because the economic motives (it is in fact a resistance to proletarianization, that is, to exploitation) are reinforced by cultural motives. But this kind of resistance will not be able to turn into revolution.

Nor should we forget that, although the models of social organization are strictly identical for both the developed world and the underdeveloped world, communism by no means excludes a variety of solutions. On the contrary, use value necessarily generates variety.

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

# LESSONS OF SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

By Tse Ka-kui

"Land Reform and Economic Development in China" by Victor D. Lippit. Special issue, *Chinese Economic Studies,* Summer 1974. White Plains, New York: International Arts & Sciences Press, 161 pp. $15.

It was one of Paul Baran's major contributions that the concepts of economic surplus, potential surplus, and actual surplus were vigorously formulated and applied to the analysis of development and underdevelopment.* By analyzing the mode of generation and utilization of the economic surplus in the underdeveloped countries, Baran was able to trace the roots of underdevelopment in the class structure of these societies as well as in capitalism as a world system. The political conclusion is that these societies would not be able to attain genuine development without a revolutionary transformation of existing class structures and a breaking-away from world capitalism.

It is perhaps a reflection of the "underdeveloped" state of Western scholarship that there has been hardly any attempt to analyze the political economy of contemporary China in terms of Baran's concepts. In the last few years, however, a growing

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The author is a Chinese student in Hong Kong currently doing research on the people's communes and socialist transition in the People's Republic of China.

* Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (Monthly Review Press, 1957).



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number of "radical" China scholars are beginning to employ the conceptual tools furnished by Baran to analyze China's political economy in the period both before and after liberation—for example, Victor Lippit's "Land Reform and Economic Development in China," and Carl Riskin's "Surplus and Stagnation in Modern China" in *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective,* edited by Dwight H. Perkins (Stanford University Press, 1975). Their findings are hardly unexpected. They showed that despite China's poverty—a characteristic of most of the Third World—the peasantry had through the centuries been producing a substantial surplus which was pumped out of the countryside for the sustenance and pleasures of the ruling classes. By employing such new concepts as "potential economic surplus" and "actual economic surplus," these writers are able to capture certain essential features of China's political economy in the twentieth century. Taking 1933 data, for example, Riskin finds that the economy had an actual surplus of about 27 percent of net domestic product, while the potential surplus of the same year could be as high as 37 percent. He also demonstrates that most of the actual surplus "was not used in growth-inducing ways but instead served to feed privileged consumption habits, hypertrophic bureaucracies, and foreign appetites." The inability of China's economy to develop, therefore, was due not so much to the poverty of the Chinese masses but rather to the then existing ownership system and its corresponding class structure. The conclusion of this analysis is equally obvious: the economic surplus could not be effectively channeled to productive investment without prior revolutionary changes in the ownership system.

The Revolution of 1949, according to both Lippit and Riskin, succeeded precisely in doing this. The Land Reform of 1950-1952 redistributed wealth and hence income from the rich to the poor, and much of what was re-distributed was captured by the state in savings, through taxation, profits of state enterprises and differential pricing. This made possible the dramatic rise in the ratio of net investment to national income from a mere 1 to 2 percent in 1949 to around 20 percent in 1953, a ratio which was maintained for most of the 1950s. The Chinese success in channeling the economic surplus to productive investment through "institutional transformation" is thus considered to be the crucial factor in explaining the achievement of economic development in China since 1949.

So much is in essence the contribution of some recent progres-

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sive analyses of China's political economy. They have explicitly employed the conceptual tools first elaborated by Baran in 1957, and their analyses and conclusions come very close to what Baran and others have arrived at for other underdeveloped countries. (I have little doubt that similar results might be obtained by applying the analysis to the USSR or Cuba.) There are thus hardly any really new insights offered by these analyses. At best, these recent studies confirm the basic soundness of Baran's analysis when applied to pre-liberation China. But both Baran and these Western writers claim to show more than this. They try to demonstrate above all that the most important task of a *post*-revolutionary government is to mobilize the maximum potential surplus for productive investment so as to attain the highest rate of growth: Baran argued this case in the light of USSR's experience; and both Lippit and Riskin, among others, have tried to show that, according to this criterion, Maoist policy does make good economic sense.

Here is the crux of the matter. It is my contention that China's experience of socialist construction in the last two decades has in fact seriously challenged this proposition, and it is in this respect that the most important lesson of the historical experiences of "socialist construction" in the USSR and China is to be drawn.

It seems that while Baran's analysis was certainly an important contribution to our understanding of the process of capitalist development and underdevelopment, the conceptual tools he furnishes are grossly inadequate for the study of post-revolutionary societies aspiring to socialism. For instance, there is much doubt that even the most rigorous analysis of the mode of utilization of the planned economic surplus in, say, post-revolution China and USSR would tell us much about the nature of these societies, much less the directions of their future development. Recent Western analyses uncritically employing Baran's concepts serve only to magnify this fundamental weakness. For the latter, moreover, there is not even the awareness of the distinction between the mode of generation of economic surplus in the post-land reform period (a small peasant economy) and that in the period after collectivization (a collective peasant economy). Similarly, the transformation of *relations of production* after the formation of communes in 1958 also fails to emerge in their analysis. This is hardly surprising, if only because of the limitations of the conceptual tools they have employed.

Baran's own theorization of the USSR's experience of "social-

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ist construction" in the final chapter of his book *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957) strikes us today in its resemblance to what the Chinese have criticized as the "theory of productive forces."* Baran reiterates the Bolshevik preoccupation with the most rapid development of the productive forces through the mobilization and "squeezing" of all possible economic surplus, even though this meant forced collectivization (which amounted to, as Paul Sweezy puts it, a cultural counter-revolution); the transformation of relations of production and people's consciousness are hardly mentioned at all. Indeed, it had been the common conviction of the Bolshevik leaders (despite their differences on specific policies) that it is only after the development of the productive forces to a sufficiently high level that socialist "relations of production" and a socialist "superstructure" could come about. And for the most rapid development of the productive forces, capitalism is to be the model: relations of production characteristic of the capitalist mode of production (e.g., the widening of the three great differences) are to be adopted, albeit under "socialist" state control.

The Chinese experience, on the other hand, has shown that it is not only important to develop the productive forces in the period of transition to socialism, but that it is even more imperative that the relations of production should be transformed in the process at the same time. What is of greater significance still, the Chinese stress, is the continuous effort to transform the people's consciousness in the very process of transforming nature and social relations. The Chinese approach rejects emphatically the notion that the development of productive forces would in any way automatically entail a transformation of the relations of production and people's consciousness; such transformation would take place only as a result of conscious and continuous class struggles and ideological struggles. The extent to which the Chinese have made a decisive step in this direction since the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, while the relations of production in the USSR have remained untransformed despite the high level of development of "productive forces" attained, constitutes the single most important lesson to be drawn from the historical experience of socialist construction in the two countries.

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* See, for example, Li Cheng, "Theory of Productive Forces: Its Counter-revolutionary Essence," *Peking Review*, 48 (1973).

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# EUROPEAN MIGRANT WORKERS: THE INVISIBLE PEOPLE

By Julie Diamond

*A Seventh Man: Migrant Workers in Europe,* text by John Berger, photographs by Jean Mohr. A Richard Seaver Book, Viking Press, 1975. 238 pp., $8.95.

Men and women from southern Europe and from former European colonies are building the cities and roads of northern Europe, producing its goods, cleaning its houses and streets. In France, 20 percent of industrial laborers are migrants, in Switzerland 40 percent. In Britain and Germany, every seventh manual laborer is a migrant. *Manual*: "of, done with, the hands." (*Webster's*) And with the body—arms, eyes, and parts of the body left idle. The European migrant is the seventh man.*

*A Seventh Man,* "a book of images and words," is about the migrant (specifically, the male migrant from Europe rather than the former colonies). A man on a ladder is shown in two photographs, at the Vienna airport. Washing a glass wall, framed by its exact lines, he is high above airport doors and above what looks like a cubist mural. Below, people—who are, like us, accus-

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Julie Diamond teaches in a nursery school day-care center in New York City.

* These figures predate the current recession. Yet differences from current figures represent only fluctuations. In February 1976, employment of foreigners in Switzerland was 27 percent; employment of Yugoslavs in northern Europe dropped to 950,000 from 1,100,000 in 1973. (*New York Times,* February 25, 1976)



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tomed to the ordinary—head for taxis and airport limousines. Black rubber mats, underfoot, open the silent, obedient doors. The man on the ladder, visible through sweeping soap paths, sudsy loops, dripping lines of dirty water, is one detail. No one thinks: How is the work? Where are you from? Have you children? Living parents? What do you earn? What do you see on the way to work?

In an article on migratory workers in an earlier MONTHLY REVIEW, Antony Ward wrote: "The present poverty of the Southern European countries of emigration (Portugal, Spain, Southern Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) must be seen, not simply as an historical, demographic, or even geographic artifact, but as the continuing effect of a total and ongoing economic system, a system which extends far beyond any one country's borders." The system, neocolonialism, has a variety of forms; to indict it, John Berger, Jean Mohr, and collaborator Sven Blomberg combine Mohr's photographs and Berger's text, which includes—besides economic analysis, facts, and statistics—poetry, memories, imagined nightmares. Together, words and pictures establish the structural meaning of migration: the result of inequality, it is essential in maintaining inequality. The dependence and economic and social erosion of countries furnishing migrants are results not of overpopulation and poverty of resources, but of alliances between international capital and local, pre-industrial elites. In a gentlemen's club in Seville, a fat man, his umbrella across the seat beside him, sums up his friends' discussion with a gesture—finger and thumb just so, in the center of his gorged gravity—whose content refers to leisure, and the style of this aristocracy. Worker shortages in advanced industrial countries are caused not by growth but by a particular kind of growth: to stimulate and absorb the overproduction upon which a "consumer" society depends, indigenous workers are needed in the expanding service and technical sectors; in those occupations they cannot, and will not, fill, i.e., the low-paying, arduous, dangerous jobs, migrants are employed.

"The terms of the equation should by now be clear. . . . Between the wastes of poverty and the wastes of affluence, he works." Giving migration this meaning, the book delineates and exposes one segment of the *practice* of underdevelopment, which desolates one area of the world, robbing it even of inhabitants, and saturates another. Photographs juxtapose a village in southern Greece, its houses and walls the texture of crumbly cheese, with

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the smoothly woven strands of a highway cloverleaf in northern Europe. The text reads: "To those who have machines, men are given."

For the capitalist, the advantage of the use of migrant laborers lies in their being *foreign*: the conditions of their employment will not be (beyond certain limits) seriously challenged by indigenous workers; furthermore there is the possibility of removing numbers of them entirely when this is in the country's interest—making the unemployed, magically, seem to vanish. For the migrant, this benefit turns into a definition of himself as "other," as one *not seen*. The experience of inequality, as well as its structure, is the book's subject. The documentation, composed of fragments, like a collage, creates discontinuities and pauses, within which a shared setting—the cities of the developed world, rimmed by glass walls—becomes for us what it is for him. Words and phrases duplicate actual moments and events, the exhaustion of factory work, a "pile of gestures being stacked minute by minute," and its surrealism: "He begins to watch his arm, as if it were being moved by what it is holding instead of by his shoulder. He thinks of water pumping his arm. The moving pieces shift his eyes, the air breathes his lungs."

We learn about his life as we know our own—as a pattern of inferences about experience, not a series of logically proceeding statements; its coherence is of a particular life, not of a point of view anyone might take toward it.

Subjectivity and its objective conditions, like geometric coordinates, locate the migrant, on these pages and in the world. In the cities of northern Europe, his movements, sensations, expressions, and losses parallel and concentrate the forms of global relations. The latter are "historical necessities." Yet for the migrant necessity consists of adaptations and choices, the most singular, pressing, and minute requirements of existence: explanations elude him. The migrant, the seventh man, is an animate link between poverty and affluence. His motives, which fit the interests and needs of international capital, are presented to him constantly by his life. To understand his situation as it is put in *A Seventh Man* is to understand the situation of people generally.

A migrant is quoted: "You could call us the niggers of Europe." You think, of course, the analysis could be reversed, derived from and applied to the New World as well as the Old—urban "minorities," tenant farmers, migrant farm workers, women. Like European migrants, they provide a pool of labor whose expansion

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and contraction with the business cycle is relatively invisible; their very selves—their history, habits, color, sex—can be used to justify their being made to do the dirty work. Their history has the same place within the history of a system of exploitative development, and the same theme: the rendering of a whole, a human life, into its most meager bits—the jobs it can be put to.

Others, their invisibility even greater, live more closely with us than American migrants: men and women, defined by uselessness rather than function, the litter of the advanced economies, the scraps of our wastefulness. Like a collection of fine pieces for an outdoor museum, they sit on the traffic islands of upper Broadway in Manhattan. At noon, in the middle of weaving cars and buses, U-turns, people dragging uncooperative children, errands, appointments, a group of five children off from school—between all this travelling and motion are certain men and women. Think first of the crazy ones: the woman who lives on the church steps; the man who walks down the street leaning into a wind that is not there—matted hair, open shoes; the woman with the face of a graduate of a "good" college. What recognition do we avoid when we look away from the mutterings and songs and gestures? Crazy; old; useless; unemployed—Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Haitian. They are there, days and nights, on the benches, between uptown and downtown traffic, where leaves and old newspapers pile up. Crossing the street, having plans and various things to attend to, we pass them at a safe distance; but, like the migrant, we are made ignorant by what we know. They are the least of us, their colors the deepest ones, their skin the most abused, the least worn. It is not *our* Broadway they are on—crazy, old, drunk; not *our* world they exist on the edges of. The world is capitalism's: it is theirs, and ours.

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# CORRESPONDENCE

## TWO VIEWS OF "THE CLASS ROOTS OF FEMINISM"

### I

By Lise Vogel

In the last ten years or so, historians and social theorists of all political persuasions have responded to the rapidly changing participation of women in various spheres of social life by taking up, once again, "the woman question." For the left the issue should be especially acute, for our goal is to transform the very conditions within which this so-called woman question has been posed. Such a transformation involves the development of theory, of concrete analyses of the current situation, of strategy, and of lines that can be tested in practice.

Among our tasks, then, is the construction of a Marxist history of the entity that is our concern when we try to answer "the woman question." Karen Sacks' article in the February 1976 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, "Class Roots of Feminism," is a serious attempt to contribute to this undertaking. Unfortunately, it does not move us beyond the analyses of the Second International or more recent mechanical versions of Marxism; indeed Sacks' article simply reinforces certain traditional shortcomings within the left concerning "the woman question." At the same time it adopts a conventional and inadequate approach to the history of class struggle. For these reasons, and because many readers of MR will probably not be familiar with the historical and methodological terrain covered by Sacks, I would like to offer a critique,



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together with some brief comments to suggest alternative directions.

Sacks' main point is that one can best understand the "women's movement" in the United States between 1820 and 1920 (and, by implication, today as well) as consisting not of "a single movement, but rather three movements which were consciously movements for the rights of women"—a working-class women's movement, a white middle-class women's movement, and a black women's movement. Where these "movements" came into conflict, class (or sometimes race) antagonisms predominated over sex solidarity. In other words, "class" is the lens that Sacks claims to use in her examination of these "self-consciously feminist movements and groups." What she then finds is that working-class women fought for "economic demands," middle-class women for "legal equality," and black women (class unknown) for "both economic improvement and legal equality with whites." Although victories have at times been won, the contradictions persist. Even today "the two longstanding working-class women's demands" for equal pay and for unionization remain. Sacks nevertheless considers the present situation to be promising, because "middle-class women's jobs have become collectivized [and] middle-class women have also moved into union situations, which at least provide a material basis for middle-class women to join working-class women rather than the ruling class."

No one on the left, I think, would disagree that the issue of class is at the root of this history.* What is currently being debated is precisely how. Rather than participate in this debate as it is evolving, Sacks relies on a more "orthodox" array of concepts. Class is defined in terms of the "material conditions [of people] as well as the social ideology regarding them." Demands are then narrowly categorized and assigned according to "class." (Sacks does not even mention the very serious problem of what "working class" and "middle class" mean as one moves through the decades from 1820 to 1920, nor what they signify today.) Similarly, types of action are correlated with class situation: working-class women find themselves in collective on-the-job situations and take collective action, while middle-class women lean towards individualistic solutions. Finally, Sacks argues that each "women's movement" identi-

* Some maintain that there are two such "roots"—class and patriarchy. However, a coherent definition of "patriarchy" together with a theory of this dual origin has not yet been elaborated.

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fies the enemy differently, and only the working-class movement understands, presumably correctly, that "it [is] clearly the employer."

The theoretical underpinning of Sacks' article should now be obvious: it is a version of the economism that permeates much historical research done from a left perspective. Economism, understood in the most general sense, tries to reduce all social experience to economic phenomena. Any significant development is traced along a direct and often automatic route to economic factors. At the root of these economic factors is the class struggle, conceived as a solely economic contradiction which manifests itself mainly in work-place situations. "Non-economic" phenomena are in some sense secondary or superstructural, and have at most a modifying effect on the more basic "economic" developments. "The economic" is thus separated from all other realms of social experience by a clean line; the intuitive obviousness of this separation is not questioned.*

In Sacks' article, as in the work of many left historians, economism thus plays a dominant role. Economism lies behind the conceptualization of class in terms of a plain mixture of "material conditions" and externally-imposed ideology. Similarly, a mechanistic dynamic of economic forces lurks in the background as the cause of every social development. Economism appears most obviously in her treatment of the practice of the three "women's movements." Sacks claims, for example, that the demands of the working-class movement through its history have been mostly economic and work-place oriented, thus always leaving political goals to middle-class movements. Moreover, she implies that when the working class organizes collectively in its fight against the enemy—identified as the employers, not the bourgeoisie *as a class*—it wins (more or sometimes, Sacks is obliged to admit, less). The suggestion that the goals of the working class are actually attainable through militant struggle within capitalism is a direct consequence of economism. Such an approach to the history of women (or of any group) does not seriously take into account struggles outside the work-place or issues of democratic rights, much less the ques-

* In fact this spontaneous "obviousness" is a product, in the sphere of ideology and consciousness, of the social relations that exist in a capitalist society. Those who employ a non-economistic approach to history would recognize and understand it as such. They would therefore be in a better position both to study the functioning of economism in a specific situation and to transcend its limitations. For more on this, see the discussion of the women factory workers below.

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tion of the state and the problems of class consciousness and revolutionary organization. In other words, it ignores the real object of the class struggle: political power and social revolution.

This analysis provides the basis for a critique of the way Sacks treats social movements. The article is organized around an initial assertion that there were three women's movements which were consciously movements for the rights of women. The text then reveals that these three "movements" were based on sex, class, and race, and follows them through time in order to comment on the relationships and contradictions among them. But what were these three movements in reality? The white middle-class movements* were made up mostly of women and tended to have as an explicit primary goal the concerns of women; thus it is reasonable to call them conscious women's movements. By contrast, the working-class organizations discussed by Sacks were not in fact women's movements at all, nor were they consciously in favor of women's rights. They were trade unions, only rarely segregated according to sex (and then only at the local level) and never taking the rights of women workers *as women* for a primary objective. What Sacks may be referring to are certain moments when, for various reasons (ranging from opportunism to the sporadic recognition that the goal of sex equality can unify rather than divide the class), the working-class movement took up issues touching on women's rights. By the "black women's movement" Sacks seems to be referring to a variety of anti-slavery movements before the Civil War, to the situation of black people after the war, and to the rise of the black club movements. As she herself acknowledges, the movements crossed both race and class lines, and their major focus was slavery and later racism. Issues of class and sex were at various times important, but the alleged existence of a black women's movement which was consciously a movement for the rights of women is Sacks' weakest construction.

What is the basis of this attempt to delineate three parallel women's movements? It is a "theory" (common among left feminists) in which sex, class, and race oppression are first assumed to be parallel and then ranked. For each oppression a movement arises. Qualitative (for example, political) differences among the "movements" are reduced to quantitatively comparable disparities: the "balance of forces" is evaluated according to a uniform scale of "strength" (measured by numbers, length of strikes, "level"

* I use the plural "movements" to stress the variety and discontinuity of what Sacks tends to treat monolithically.

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of militance, etc.). In order to rank the three parallel oppressions and movements Sacks must then declare the priority of one of them: class. Class functions, therefore, simply as the right answer to the unstated question of which of the three "movements" is to be considered the "best" or "strongest" on some value hierarchy of the left. In short, the claim that class is the key turns out to be simply a moral imperative, not a principle of analysis or social theory.

In political terms, class appears as only one of three co-equal contradictions. The relationships among the contradictions are not explained. The fundamental role of the class struggle is in effect obscured. The real problems—in particular, those concerning the nature and status of sex, class, and race issues in a society dominated by the capitalist mode of production—remain to be confronted.

Sacks' general approach to history is thus theoretically and politically flawed. Similar weaknesses appear in her treatment of the particulars of history. Specifically, her methodological assumptions lead her to ignore the results of more than a decade of research by those historians who, working within the terms of the "new" social history, have attempted to correct some of the inadequacies of an older tradition which had focused too narrowly on organization, ideology, and political activity, in order to study the whole fabric of social life. The result of the new research, in terms of empirical material, has been extremely important. In particular, the history of working-class experience can now go beyond the overemphasis, characteristic of traditional labor history, on workers on the job and in their collective organizations and actions.* Moreover, certain groups that were once virtually absent from historical accounts—women are one example—have become more visible.

As an example of how the recent research in social history might have been used, let us consider Sacks' account of the women who worked in the textile industry in the decades before the Civil

* This is not to say that the "new" social history does not have its own political failings. Specifically, its approach tends to put an essentially idealist emphasis on the minutiae of daily life and on the ongoing resistance and struggle of individuals. All too often it forgets that the struggle is a *class* struggle. Thus, like the economistic tradition of labor history, the new social history tends to see the working class as involved in a perennial battle which somehow lacks an ultimate outcome. Both approaches generally fail to recognize that they have circumscribed the struggle within the capitalist system.

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War. According to her, the workers in the early textile mills were young unmarried farm women, who stayed in factory work for only short periods. After the panic of 1837, however, the workers "were, by and large, landless native-born and Irish immigrants who could no longer quit if wages and hours were unsatisfactory." The combination of oppressive working conditions and a collective workplace situation quite naturally gave rise to organization. Demands were purely economic (better wages, the ten-hour day) and they were pursued "solely" by collective action. Although the movement was centered in New England, the "biggest" struggle somehow took place in western Pennsylvania, where militant workers struck in 1845 and again in 1848 for nearly two months. Some gains were won, and all in all "these early textile battles show the militance and leadership women gave to the early labor movement."

There are numerous inadequacies in this version of history.[1]* For example, native-born women from Yankee farms, whose stay in the mill towns was essentially temporary, made up more than four fifths of the workforce through the late 1840s, and even in the 1850s about half the workers were Yankee women. Various types of individual acts of resistance, as well as spontaneous strikes, were frequent from the 1820s on, and increased in the 1840s. Sustained collective action, carried out by a number of extremely short-lived labor-reform associations and newspapers, spanned a period of six or seven years in the 1840s, and then came to a rather abrupt stop. The object of some of these actions went well beyond the "purely" economic, and indeed the borders between "economic" and other types of goals were especially permeable in the nineteenth century. Most important, militancy, consciousness, and organization were not, as Sacks suggests, the automatic or predetermined products of collective oppression. Nor was the response of these women—who were the first American factory workers—monolithically the same. In order to reconstruct their experience and grasp its significance, one must do more than focus on organizational forms and militant struggles.

This is not the place to provide an alternative account of the New England mill women and their organizations.[2] The textile workers constitute a very specific example in Sacks' article, and social historians may well challenge much of her other material and interpretations. Here, as elsewhere, the fundamental problem is her adherence to the economism of conventional labor history,

* Numbered notes will be found at the end of the article.

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which obscures the importance of considering such issues and at the same time limits the scope of the class struggle.

In conclusion I would like to sketch the bare outlines of an alternative approach to the problems discussed in this critique. What is at stake, I think, is the distinction between Marxism and revisionism, and I doubt that this line has ever been clearly and broadly drawn for "the woman question." Indeed, I would argue that, despite a century of work and in some cases the best of intentions, we do not even have an adequate knowledge of what the object of "the woman question" is. The economism of Sacks' article and its reformist consequences are unfortunately not all that different from the Marxist "tradition" in this area. They are easy to criticize, but the process of building a serious alternative has just begun. In this context, Althusser's remark that the results of recent theoretical work can have "*revolutionary* effects in the fields which this science has not yet really touched" is useful.[8] Surely "the woman question" is such a field.

What then is needed to understand the phenomena Sacks discusses and to start to unravel "the woman question"? First, a great deal more empirical work must be done, for we are barely at the level of a descriptive understanding. This work must be informed by a consistent political outlook. In particular, we must try not to reproduce the traditional errors of economism: its isolation of on-the-job from all other experience, its overemphasis on economic issues, its assumption that working-class goals are restricted to the economic sphere. One approach would be to choose topics—that is, actual situations which deserve a concrete analysis—in order intentionally to cross the borders set up by economism. For example, recent work by social historians has focused on subjects on either side of those borders such as: family life in given groups, the development of specific residential communities, the trade-union experience of certain women workers, the labor process in various industries, the history and meaning of scientific management. It is necessary, however, to design studies—of contemporary as well as of historical situations—that force an integration of *all* relevant aspects, and define their limits mainly in terms of space and time.

Empirical work can provide only some of the preconditions for an elaborated theory that will begin to resolve "the woman question" in a rigorous manner. Naturally, it is impossible to specify the substance of this theory in advance, but some observations may be made. The theory will have to go beyond description, par-

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tial analyses, and pragmatic politics. It must confront "the woman question" in terms of Marxist theory. This will probably mean, among other things, developing an analysis of the reproduction of labor power and of the process of what Marx called "individual consumption," a critique of the family to the extent that it is an ideological (rather than theoretical) concept, and a theory of the variant forms of "family" possible in societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In the past several years some useful work has been done on these questions, but the efforts have remained essentially isolated.[4] If future work can build on previous advances, including where necessary a certain amount of comradely polemicizing, we may soon replace the theoretical component of "the woman question" with a more meaningful concept. Inasmuch as revolutionary politics is rooted in Marxist theory, we may also be closer to developing an analysis and strategy that can effectively be put into practice.

## NOTES

1. Here, as in the rest of the article, Sacks bases her account on an arbitrary scattering of secondary sources. In the case of the mill women, she omits at least three fundamental books (which are also more progressive than two of the three she does cite), and two important articles: Helen L. Sumner, *History of Women in Industry in the United States, Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States,* vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1910), ch. 2; Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840-1860* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924), chs. 8-10; Vera Shlakman, *Economic History of a Factory Town,* Smith College Studies in History, vol. 20, nos. 1-4 (Northampton, 1935); Ray Ginger, "Labor in a Massachusetts Cotton Mill, 1853-1860," *Business History Review,* vol. 28 (1954), pp. 67-91; H. M. Gitelman, "The Waltham System and the Coming of the Irish," *Labor History,* vol. 8 (1967), pp. 227-53; for the history of the industry one must also consult Caroline Ware, *Early New England Cotton Manufacture* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1931). More recent work could also have been used (see note 2). The issue is not "good" or "academic" history versus reliance on secondary sources. Rather, it is how one makes a concrete analysis of an actual situation—now, or in the past. Surely, one must begin with a reasonably thorough and accurate investigation.
2. Some recent studies provide good accounts of the mill women and the labor reform organizations: Thomas Dublin, "Women, Work, and the Family: Female Operatives in the Lowell Mills, 1830-1860," *Feminist Studies,* vol. 3 (1975), pp. 30-39; Thomas Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in Nineteenth-Century America* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), chs. 2-4; John Kasson, *Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900* (New York: Viking, 1976), pp. 53-106; Lise Vogel, "Their Own Work: Two Documents from the Nineteenth-Century Labor Movement," *Signs,* vol. 1, no. 3, pt. 1 (Spring 1976), pp. 787-802, and

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*Women of Spirit, Women of Action: Mill Workers of Nineteenth-Century New England* (Somersworth: New Hampshire Publishing Company, in press).

3. Louis Althusser, "Reply to John Lewis (Self Criticism)," *Marxism Today* (November 1972), p. 344.
4. At least four rough groupings of articles can be cited. First, the theoretically sophisticated articles published in England in *New Left Review* and the *Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists* (Juliet Mitchell, Ian Gough, Wally Seccombe, Jeanne Gardiner, John Harrison, and others). Second, a number of pieces written from a "radical sociology" viewpoint (especially those by Eli Zaretsky and Albert Szymanski in *Socialist Revolution* and *Insurgent Sociologist*). Third, the articles and pamphets associated with the European "wages for housework" perspective (Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Selma James). Fourth, work produced from within the Marxist trend of the North American women's liberation movement (Margaret Benston, Peggy Morton, Paddy Quick, Heidi Hartmann, Amy Bridges, Gayle Rubin, Renate Bridenthal, and others; see also my "The Earthly Family," *Radical America,* vol. 7, nos. 4-5 [Fall 1973], *Rummaging through the Primitive Past: A Note on Family, Industrialization, and Capitalism,* Newberry Papers in Family and Community History [1976], and "Class Struggle and 'The Woman Question': Notes toward a Theory" [in progress]. Virtually none of the authors in one grouping makes any critique, or even mention, of articles in the others. This is especially unfortunate where the subjects treated are the same, as in the various attempts to develop a Marxist analysis of housework, using the categories of productive and unproductive labor. Surely it is time that we take ourselves and the task sufficiently seriously to build on each other's work.

Somerville, Massachusetts
April 1976

II

## By Bonnie Mass

"Class Roots of Feminism" by Karen Sacks (MR, February 1976) offers a brief but vital historical sketch of certain working-class realities, present from the early nineteenth century to the post-First World War period, which have heretofore been absent from the majority of women's political writings, represented by such noted contemporary feminists as Kate Millett, Shulamith Firestone, Germaine Greer, or Juliet Michell. No longer are women projected as alienated and atomized beings who function solely

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according to an ideology of material transcendence. Karen Sacks perceives women as beings who actually interact with their surroundings through social relationships. Women cease to remain abstractions of alienation and become healthy living human beings who collectively join together in their own interest, oftentimes with working men, on the basis of social and material necessity and consciousness.

It would take more than several books even to begin to counter the conscious historical omission of working women's courageous and complex role in the crafts trades, factories, farms, etc. Sacks' article is one of the first which has courageously provided us with a glimpse of the vast yet largely unexplored territory of these women in the United States, perhaps suppressed in the recent decade because of the deep antagonism in the feminist movement toward other women of history who have dared champion the cause of a deformed labor movement, considered to be more closely associated with their own interests than with those of other feminist organizations which are based primarily on gaining rights that middle-class women have not yet attained.

Such a broad educational endeavor, however, with the subsequent lessons to be gleaned, is urgent during the present period when severe recessionary conditions for women and men closely resemble those at the turn of the century. For without an understanding of the viewpoints held by working-women's organizations of the early 1900s concerning the nature of the system which permeated all phases of their daily existence, and without knowledge of the complex internal organizational conflicts which were caused by these viewpoints, it becomes impossible to pinpoint and to digest the deadly historical errors, the understanding of which would seem so crucial to any effective organizing efforts of women today.

Just as working women's far-reaching class interests were undermined in the early 1900s when a powerful labor movement existed, established organizations of women today such as the League of Women Voters, or the National Organization of Women, and labor organizations such as the Coalition of Labor Union Women, consciously make decisions which circumvent political strategies intended to couch women's rights in imperative class realities. The advantage of discussing this early period of Susan B. Anthony and the National American Women's Suffrage Association is that if our examination is carried far enough, we may discover what political factors have lead to the demise or cooptation

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of the more progressive women's groupings within the feminist and labor movements. There would seem to be much to learn from the National Women's Trade Union League which led working women into functioning as strike breakers against the AFL as early as 1890, showing that working-women's demands were minimized by a bureaucracy that sidetracked militant women's organizational autonomy and that used women to make the labor movement more "acceptable" to status quo opinion.

Today, the issues of women's rights are often debased in the form of fashionable window dressing, particularly for regimes which are actually strangling the working class, as in Chile, Brazil, Iran, and others. While perpetuating extreme misery and poverty, they claim to emancipate women from domestic servitude. Women are pushed into the labor market as non-unionized wage labor and several discriminatory laws are abolished which prevent women from voting (particularly the propertied class), from attending school, and from access to birth control, which is often utilized as population control. Ms. Pinochet of Chile is particularly known for having campaigned for these reforms during International Women's Year. Thus, what may appear to many feminists as emancipation is actually camouflage for a dictatorship to maintain a degree of repression virtually unsurpassed in human history. Perhaps by examining in greater depth the nature of capitalist strategy in the seventies, the manner in which the working class is splintered into the categories of race, sex, trades and wages would become clear, and no one would be fooled by empty rhetoric which really means divisive tokenism in practice. If window dressing of this type is to be avoided, particularly with regard to organized and unorganized labor movements, the birth and development of women's labor organizing has to be integrally tied to the broader historical forces of the times and the attitudes which are represented by them.

In its brevity, this historical sketch fails to speculate on the attitudes that prevailed among progressive Abolitionist women on the nature of society and the question of women's role in the production and reproduction processes of that society. The protectionist measures taken towards "self-help"-oriented activities among Abolitionist working women clearly indicates the lack of consciousness concerning an exploitative economic system as the major culprit for denied rights. However, without knowledge of these specific political attitudes manifested in class antagonisms between women's abolitionist groups, we cannot discover how the "demo-

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cratic" platform of working-class women was defeated in favor of the pro-slavery groups of the Reconstruction period. There is revealing information on the contrasting viewpoints of liberal-minded Jessie Ashley and other more racist suffragists, but it is unclear which social attitudes represented by the post-Civil War bourgeoisie facilitated the evolution of women in NAWSA towards social workers in the settlement houses, "Christians-only" Temperance Unions, and even the Ku Klux Klan.

At the turn of the century, within the labor movement itself, it is confusing to see two powerful but antagonistic organizations such as the IWW and the National Women's Trade Union League existing side by side with little knowledge of the struggle, or lack of it, between the two.

The political responsibility of examining the intricacies of organizational decision-making and power struggles is often regarded with suspicion as a pastime of a "male-dominated, sectarian left"; however, despite the poor visible benefits from dissecting these past matters, evidence from Sacks' article leads to an understanding that women's social struggles waged between and among feminist and labor organizations were largely resolved on the basis of how effectively these struggles were carried forth, the socio-political attitudes held by women activists, and the class forces which backed those organizations.

Historical witness to the *lack* of effective class struggle in the middle-class women's movement (also manifested in 1915 as the Birth Control Movement), was the emergence of Margaret Sanger as noted spokeswoman for women's rights. She arrived on the international scene as an ideal feminist, virtually uncriticized for her attacks on the labor movement and her biological characterizations of the immigrant working class as "unfit." Margaret Sanger was once a spokeswoman in the Socialist Party for women's full social and economic emancipation, which included women's right to birth control. She had walked on the Paterson strike lines with Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, John Reed, and Bill Haywood, but soon turned her back on labor, adopting the conservative notions of Samuel Gompers and espousing a backward Malthusian philosophy. In 1920, she wrote, "Every unionist knows as a matter of course that with the number kept small enough, his organization can have increases of wages, steady employment, and decent working conditions." And in 1922 she incorporated intense anti-labor feeling into the middle-class birth-control campaign, merging ideologically with the popular ruling-class pseudo-scientists of the

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day—the eugenicists. Attesting to the firmness of this merger, Sanger wrote a book in 1920 entitled *Woman and the New Race,* and in 1922 she wrote *The Pivot of Civilization,* both of which attempted to document an inferior intelligence of "foreigners." Her books were widely circulated in the United States and Britain.

More practically, Margaret Sanger as well as women from NAWSA called for immigration restrictions, which were subsequently enacted.

Perhaps if more political light were shed on past inter- and intra-class struggle in the development of women's organizing, together with the study of contemporary social forces which influenced their direction, then the embryonic beginnings of present-day organizations might not be destined to suffer the cooptations or demises of the past.

MONTHLY REVIEW will, I hope, present readers with more on this aspect of the Woman Question.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
March 1976

**U.S. THREATENS DEPORTATION TO TORTURE CAMPS IN IRAN**

On November 10, 1976, 91 Iranian students were arrested in Houston, Texas. They were peacefully demonstrating at the French consulate, against the arrest of two leading members of the Confederation of Iranian Students in France and the deportation of four others.

The increasing repression of the Iranian student movement abroad is part of a campaign orchestrated by the Shah's regime and SAVAK agents around the world, aided by the U.S. and Western European governments.

These 91 students, released only after a hunger strike, now face deportation and possible death at the hands of the Shah. They await deportation hearings in Houston within a few weeks.

The campaign to defend these students needs your support.

**Please send contributions to:**

**ISA 91 Defense Fund**
**P.O. Box 1231**
**Houston, Texas 77001**

**Please send cables or letters to:**

**The Attorney General**
**Department of Justice**
**Washington, D.C.**

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)
should not be more than 5,000 words, and preferably less), obscure presentation (e.g., dependence on specialized jargon), too much academic paraphernalia (footnotes, references, etc.). If the reaction of the first reader is positive or undecided, a second and sometimes a third reading becomes necessary. At this stage a discussion takes place, resulting in rejection, acceptance more or less as is, or communication with the author to secure agreed-upon changes. (3) Perhaps the largest number of mss. are neither obvious rejections nor obvious candidates for acceptance. The preferred way of handling these is to send them to outside readers (a couple of dozen, more or less, have agreed to act in this capacity). When their reports are received, the procedure from then on is like that described under (2) above.

Why bother you with this recital of editorial procedures? The reason is simply to make plain why the handling of incoming mss., with few exceptions (immediate rejections and near-immediate acceptances), takes time. Moreover the larger the inflow the longer the average time per ms. Many of you who have submitted mss. know this from personal experience, and we want you to understand why, as well as why there is not much we can do about it. You should know that as of the time of writing there are many mss. somewhere in the pipeline and that the average time they remain there is growing. On the other hand, there are things authors can do about it. Here are some of them: (1) If you are in a hurry and think you have a good chance of publication elsewhere, go that route *before* you try us. (2) Be careful to observe MR's limitations and needs as to length, subject matter, intelligibility to non-specialized readers, etc. (in too many cases authors expect editors to do their work for them, and this tends to clog the pipeline). (3) Don't send drafts and half-finished work in the hope of getting back criticism, suggestions for revision, etc. (4) Send two copies of clean, double-spaced typed, proof-read manuscript. We shall probably have more to say about these and related problems in this space in future issues.

The Marxist Literary Group of the Midwest Modern Language Association has asked us to announce that papers are being solicited for the Marxist Forum at the Association's meetings in November 1977 in Chicago. The topic is "Application of Marxist Feminist Criticism"; abstracts should be submitted by the beginning of April and completed paper by the beginning of May. Communications to Renny Harrigan, German Dep't., Box 413, Univ. of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201.

Our October issue carried an ad for the periodical *Kapitalistate* which the editors tell us has been very effective. But the address given there has been changed to P.O. Box 1292, Palo Alto, CA 94302. Subscriptions and communications will be expedited if this address rather than the one given in the ad is used.

Our good friend Malcolm Caldwell, the energetic and ebullient editor of the excellent review *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (London), will be on a lecture tour in the United States from March 28th to mid-April. Information on lecture subjects, possible dates, etc., can be obtained from Prof. Peter Bell, Social Science Division, SUNY-Purchase, Purchase, N.Y. 10577. We can testify from personal experience that Malcolm is always sure to be well informed on latest developments in Asia and to give a good account of himself.



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